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Abstract 
International security institutions play a pivotal role in the realisation of the Women, Peace and Security 
agenda through their adoption and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. This 
article examines NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325, drawing upon Cynthia Enloe’s conception of 
NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ disseminating lessons on gender. In doing so, it finds UNSCR 1325 has 
been understood to be of ‘added-value’ to the Alliance in two respects: first, to support NATO’s long-
established agenda to increase the representation of women in NATO forces; second, as a tool to 
increase operational effectiveness. I find that NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 emerged as part of a 
counter discourse. The fact that this counter discourse was put forward by partner states challenges 
dominant understandings of the direction of policy dissemination within NATO. This case provides 
salient lessons on the opportunities for – and hindrances to – change through the pursuit of a feminist 
agenda within an international security institution. 
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Introduction 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the preeminent international security 
institution spanning Europe and North America. This means that understanding the nature of 
NATO’s engagement with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, 
Peace and Security (WPS) is of considerable importance and requires examination of the 
unique set of organisational politics arising from NATO’s dual military and political/civilian 
structure. The article draws upon a feminist security studies framework to interrogate NATO’s 
adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2007; the development of the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) policy on UNSCR 1325; and the resulting military concept, which extended 
these provisions to NATO-led operations. In order to do so, Cynthia Enloe’s understanding of 
NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ (1983: 131) – sharing lessons on best practice in relation to 
gender – is used to analyse not only NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 but also how NATO 
came to view UNSCR 1325 instrumentally as of ‘added value’ to the Alliance. Building on 
Enloe’s conception, the article outlines the nature of NATO’s particular gender regime as an 
institution of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012), and conceives of NATO as much more 
than a collective defence organisation, but rather as a ‘political community in the realm of 
defence’ (Kitchen, 2010).  
In order to do so, the article interrogates NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 in three parts. 
First, the article contextualises NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 against the backdrop of 
decades of feminist organising within NATO. This has culminated in the creation of gender 
machinery in both NATO’s military and political/civilian structures, which now serves to 
support NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325. The most significant development has been 
the creation of the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative on Women, Peace and 
Security in the political/civilian structure. The role of femocrats within NATO structures has 
proved crucial; however, as the article shows, these individuals have faced significant 
challenges. One of these challenges has been the side-lining of WPS as a result of a perception 
that it is a ‘personal agenda’, even when it is part of an institutional mandate; another is the 
association of gender with women.  
The second part of the article examines the role of NATO members and NATO partners in 
supporting the emergence of UNSCR 1325 as part of a counter-discourse. This analysis finds 
that states have come to value UNSCR 1325 as a diplomatic tool with the utility to further their 
own agendas and increase their influence - incommensurate with their status  - within the 
Alliance. The central role of partner states challenges assumptions that NATO partnerships are 
(solely) outward facing and that NATO sets the parameters of the relationship (Webber, 
Hallams and Smith, 2014: 776). Further, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in conjunction with 
EAPC serves to symbolise a separation of the WPS agenda from the core business of the 
Alliance. 
Finally, the third part of the article examines the impact that framing UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added 
value’ to NATO has had on the transformative potential of the Resolution. In part, this has 
resulted from situating UNSCR 1325 as an extension of NATO’s existing agenda to increase 
the representation of women in the NATO forces but also as a tool to increase operational 
effectiveness. This analysis situates NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 within the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, where the Resolution 
facilitated a shared starting point from which to foster a community with NATO partners and 
contributors to the ISAF mission, including Sweden. 
This article makes three significant contributions. First, through examining the adoption of 
UNSCR 1325 by the pre-eminent European security actor, NATO, this article makes an 
important contribution to the understanding of UNSCR 1325 at the regional level. This is 
important because NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has created a regional action plan and 
framework through which the meaning of WPS can and is contested by NATO members (and 
partner states). Second, it contributes to understandings of how NATO functions as an 
organisation; the role of critical actors or femocrats in supporting transformative agendas and 
in particular the value of NATO partnerships for both NATO and partner states.  Finally, in 
developing Cynthia Enloe’s conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’, the article 
underscores the importance of feminist security studies scholars engaging in the study of 
international security institutions in order to understand how global gender norms – such as 
UNSCR 1325 – are shaped by them.  
This article draws upon both primary and secondary sources to examine NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325. Although much of the information can be found in open sources, including 
scholarly work and NATO documentation, closed sources offer additional insights. Therefore, 
confidential semi-structured interviews were conducted with 21 officials working for, or at, 
NATO and based in Belgium or the USA in order to understand NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 
1325 as fully as possible. The interviews took place over a six-month period between February 
2014 and August 2014. All of the interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity. For 
this reason, no distinction is made between individuals employed directly by NATO, NATO 
members or partner states. 
NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ 
In order to understand NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 it is necessary to understand how 
NATO functions as a gender regime. This can be done through examining NATO’s 
organisational structure and the reproduction of gendered inequalities within it. Gender regimes 
refer to the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all 
organisational structures and at the same time are unique to each organisational context 
(Walby, 1997: 6). The gender regimes underpinning international security institutions are 
premised upon hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012). The concept of hegemonic 
masculinity refers to the particular set of masculine norms and practices that come to 
subordinate other masculinities, enabling the continued dominance of men over women 
(Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). Hegemonic masculinity is the norm and is normative, 
but it is never explicit and although this hegemony could be supported by force, it has primarily 
been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by 
institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). For example, Connell (1995: 213) argues that the 
military (in Europe and the US) occupies the most important position for the definition of 
hegemonic masculinity. This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic military alliance, a key site for 
the transfer of gendered values. 
Institutions of hegemonic masculinity are characterised by the dominance of male bodies and 
masculine practices (Kronsell, 2011: 284) and a division of labour along gender lines both in 
terms of roles and physical space (Acker, 1990: 146–147). NATO is an organisation dominated 
by men, who occupy 77.5% of senior management positions and 69% of A-grade staff (NATO, 
2012). This inequality is most visible at the top level, with no woman having served as 
Secretary General and only one woman having served as an Assistant Secretary General.1 
Instead, women are located in administrative and civilian roles where they do reach a gender 
balance with men (defined by NATO as a 40-60 ratio) (NATO, 2012). This is evidence of the 
role international organisations play in reproducing and reinforcing power constructed through 
gender hierarchies (Enloe, 2004: 281), with organisational structure forming a core component 
of this gendering process (Acker, 1990). 
NATO’s gender regime forms the basis of the institution’s role as, what Cynthia Enloe has 
described, a ‘teaching machine’ and ‘structure for experimentation in gender’ among member 
states (1983: 131). At the political strategic level, as Enloe (1983) identifies, this extends to 
learning lessons on what works, and what does not work in respect of the integration of women 
into the military (and by extension the adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325). This 
occurs through both formal and informal channels in NATO’s military and political/civilian 
structures. Enloe’s (1983) understanding of NATO is supported by Kitchen’s (2010:7) 
contention that NATO is far more than just an alliance brought together against a common 
threat, but has remained a community bound together by shared values. NATO members, 
therefore, ‘share a common identity, view their security as intertwined, and see a common 
destiny’ (Kitchen, 2010: 11). This is important because it allows space for the introduction of 
a counter-discourse based on values, rather than just a security rationale. 
NATO’s political community is underpinned by a commitment to reflexivity and it is through 
ongoing talk and debate that members demonstrate not only their commitment to this 
community but create the community (Kitchen, 2010). Building upon this premise, NATO’s 
unique structure, which relies upon an extensive committee system, supports the organisation’s 
role as a ‘teaching machine’ enabling member states to focus on specific issues and 
practicalities, such as UNSCR 1325. NATO is not, in contrast to other international institutions, 
a ‘cumbersome forum for discussing big issues’ (Wallander, 2000: 724). This allows space for 
smaller member states to put certain items onto NATO’s agenda and challenges understandings 
of NATO as an institution whose agenda is primarily dictated by the US acting as the ‘internal 
socialization agent’ (Flockhart, 2011: 266). It is this conception of NATO as a ‘teaching 
machine’ that provides the basis for analysing NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325. As this 
article goes on to identify, at NATO ‘learning’ about UNSCR 1325 occurs through both 
informal (socialisation) and formal (NATO’s gender machinery) structures.  
 
Feminists and femocrats: Advancing feminist agendas at NATO 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 took many feminists by surprise. Cynthia Cockburn (2011), 
for example, took exception to the adoption of this ‘feminist achievement’ by an organisation 
perceived as the bastion of militarised masculinity. Indeed, as Nadine Puechguirbal (2010: 179) 
asks, why would such institutions ‘open the doors to change and share the power and privileges 
they have accumulated over the years?’. It is here that building upon Enloe’s (1983) conception 
of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ provides a framework for interrogating NATO’s adoption 
of UNSCR 1325 from a feminist perspective and understanding how the Resolution came to 
be on NATO’s agenda. 
Feminist agendas are not new to NATO and there is evidence that femocrats have been 
operating within NATO for over 50 years. For the purpose of this article, femocrats are 
understood as individuals who act on their own, even in spite of the system, to initiate policy 
initiatives which benefit women (they do not necessarily have to be women) (Prugl, 2004: 69). 
It is femocrats who were instrumental in bringing the status of women in the military to the 
attention of NATO allies and whose actions supported the creation of NATO’s gender 
machinery, first in the military and then the political/civilian structure. This gender machinery 
has provided the locus for advancing women’s interests within the Alliance, and now for the 
integration of UNSCR 1325.  
The first NATO Conference on Women took place in Copenhagen in 1961 and was the result 
of an initiative by senior military women to draw attention to the status, employment conditions 
and career opportunities for women within NATO forces. The delegates, including those from 
Denmark, Holland, Norway, UK and USA agreed to organise future conferences, expressing 
hope that other NATO allies would consider increasing the representation of women in their 
armed forces (Gil Ruiz, 2012: 91). Five years later, the Directors’ Conference of Senior Women 
Officers was hosted by NATO’s Information Service. These two conferences led to the creation 
of the ad hoc Committee on Women in NATO Forces in 1973, which was officially recognised 
by the Military Committee in 1976 (North Atlantic Military Committee, 2014). The goal of 
Committee on Women in NATO Forces was to share ‘knowledge and information’ with NATO 
members (and later EAPC partners) on the integration of women into the military in order to 
create ‘harmony in the workplace’ (Harris, 1997). This Committee and its subsequent iterations 
would become the focal point point of NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of 
women and gender, and later UNSCR 1325. 
Over the following decades the Committee on Women in NATO Forces has held an annual 
conference attended by national delegations from NATO member states and (since 2007) 
NATO partners (Harris, 1997). Despite this, it was not until the late 1990s that further 
development occurred at NATO in respect of the status of women in the armed forces, and 
again this impetus came from femocrats engaged with the issue. In 1997 NATO’s Military 
Committee approved the creation of an office to support the work of the Committee on Women 
in NATO Forces on a three-year trial basis. This was the result of lobbying by the then 
Chairperson of Committee on Women in NATO Forces and the Director of the International 
Military Staff (IMS) to provide continuity in pursuit of the Committee’s goals (NATO, 2007a) 
and provided the Alliance with its first formal gender machinery. The office, however, was far 
from a permanent part of NATO’s structure  and it was the efforts of the two femocrats which 
headed up the Office on Women in NATO Forces (Major Sarah Garcia, supported by Master 
Sergeant Michele Tyler) which led to the Military Committee granting the office permanent 
status  (NATO, 2007a). This was a significant development which would help facilitate the 
adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325 by NATO’s military structure.   
The Office on Women in NATO Forces played a crucial role in supporting the work of the 
Committee on Women in NATO Forces through the collection of annual reports from member 
states to monitor the status of women in NATO forces (Obradovic, 2014:52). In 2009 the terms 
of reference of Committee on Women in NATO Forces were extended to include the 
integration of a gender perspective and to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The 
committee was also renamed as the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives and the office 
as the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives (NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, 
2012). Against this history, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 appears not so much as a surprising 
development but as a logical progression in the development of NATO’s gender machinery. It 
also demonstrates that femocrats can work to advance their agendas within resistant 
institutions. Moreover, NATO’s gender machinery has provided a crucial focal point for the 
adoption and implementation of UNSCR 1325, in particular through the extension of the annual 
reports from member states to include monitoring on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 
(NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, 2012). 
The development of gender machinery in NATO’s military structure has only recently been 
replicated in NATO’s political/civilian structure. The creation of the post of Secretary 
General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in 2012 – approved at 
NATO’s Chicago Summit – is a significant development in the implementation of UNSCR 
1325 at NATO. However, this post would have remained vacant had Norway not volunteered 
to fund the role for two years, appointing Norwegian diplomat Mari Skåre to the post (NATO 
Official, 2014). At the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 the role became a permanent part of 
NATO’s structure (NATO, 2012). The role of the Special Representative, as a high-level focal 
point for NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, represents a significant symbolic 
commitment to the WPS agenda by NATO and was highlighted as best practice for regional 
organisations in the Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325  (Coomaraswamy, 
2015). 
At the organisational level, the pursuit of a feminist agenda at NATO has drawn attention to 
the role of femocrats operating within NATO in both the military and political/civilian 
structures over many decades. These individuals are crucial for supporting transformative 
change within organisations, which occurs at the site of ‘everyday routines and practices’ 
(Kronsell, 2011: 286). Their agenda is both ‘emotional and personal’ (Rao, 2013: location 248), 
forcing individuals to re-examine their own beliefs and behaviours against the largely hostile 
backdrop of the organisation they are working to change (Rao, 2013: location 248). This 
backdrop makes it difficult for femocrats to seek support from colleagues within the 
organisation. They are also isolated from outside support because they operate in a separate 
sphere from feminist activists who are, moreover, often resistant to engaging with them 
(Manuh, Anyidoho, and Pobee-Hayford, 2013: location 1322-1355). The adoption and 
implementation of the WPS agenda by NATO has exemplified this issue, with a number of 
NATO Officials interviewed commenting on the personal nature of the WPS agenda. For 
example, one stated that ‘UNSCR 1325 tends to stoke strange feelings… [and it] becomes 
emotional’ (NATO Official, 2014). For this individual, it seemed that almost everyone they 
encountered had a pre-formed opinion on the WPS agenda or a personal experience they could 
relate in relation to gender, regardless of whether they were supportive of or resistant to the 
WPS agenda. UNSCR 1325 was not perceived as a ‘neutral’ issue, even if it was – as a different 
NATO Official put it – a difficult issue to openly oppose (NATO Official, 2014). Tacit 
resistance was another matter. Another NATO Official highlighted how easy it was to write 
off the agenda because it was perceived as a personal agenda affecting women, even though it 
remains, officially, an institutional imperative. This perception serves to place UNSCR 1325 
outside of NATO’s core remit and draws attention to the difficulty of mainstreaming a 
transformative agenda within a resistant institution. 
The perception of UNSCR 1325 as an issue which is additional, rather than integral to NATO’s 
core identity as a defensive institution, has been exacerbated through the overrepresentation of 
women in posts responsible for delivering on UNSCR 1325, particularly given that a number 
of these women have no previous experience of, or expertise on the issue (NATO Official, 
2014).2  The implication of women being perceived by extension of their gender as a natural 
fit for a role working on gender results in the framing of gender as  synonymous  with women. 
This performative reproduction of gender (Zalewski, 2010:24) serves to reinforce, rather than 
challenge existing gender relations (an essential strategy for transformative change within 
organisations) (Cockburn, 2010: 143). In part, this is a reflection of a weakness within UNSCR 
1325 itself, which has framed gender as synonymous with women (Shepherd, 2008: 171). That 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has not sought to challenge the logic within the Resolution 
is to be expected and demonstrates a hindrance to realising transformative agendas in 
international security institutions. 
The emergence of a counter-discourse: The ‘friends of 1325’ 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged assumptions that NATO partnerships are 
(solely) a means through which NATO can influence the aspirations of non-members by setting 
the parameters of the relationship (Wallander, 2000: 729). It also challenges understandings of 
NATO as an institution whose agenda is dictated by the USA acting as the ‘internal 
socialization agent’ (Flockhart, 2011: 266). This is because of the central role of partner states 
in supporting the Women, Peace and Security agenda at NATO from the outset. Most 
significant, is that in a departure from the usual NATO protocol, the proposal for the 
NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 was first heard by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC) before being raised at the North Atlantic Council (NATO [Wikileaks] 2007c). The 
EAPC is a composed of both NATO member and partner states and is merely intended as a 
forum for dialogue and consultation. This challenge to convention led the Turkish Permanent 
Representative to raise an objection at the North Atlantic Council that NATO partners had been 
involved in discussions on an issue requiring action by the senior military authority in NATO. 
In response, the US Ambassador Nuland suggested the North Atlantic Council approve the 
measure there and then, which they did (NATO [Wikileaks] 2007c). This discussion suggests 
that the Military Committee (as the primary source of military advice to North Atlantic 
Council) had not put forward a proposal to NAC for a NATO policy on UNSCR 1325. It also 
demonstrates that norm sharing can be a multi-directional process, with NATO partners having 
had a significant role in introducing UNSCR 1325 onto NATO’s agenda. This is significant 
given that the widening and broadening of NATO partnerships, including into Asia and the 
Middle East, necessitates a reassessment of the value of partnerships (for NATO and partners), 
even if NATO has yet to fully resolve the purpose of such partnerships (Moore, 2012: 57). 
The continued role of partner states has proven crucial to the advancement of the WPS agenda 
at NATO, in particular through an informal ad hoc working group of states (NATO, 2010) 
known as the ‘friends of 1325’ (NATO Official 2014). The ‘friends of 1325’ brought together 
a diverse range of 20 states which sought to champion UNSCR 1325 at NATO (NATO 2010), 
including; Austria, Croatia, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.3 Their 
reasons for participating varied but in the majority of cases related to WPS being a key foreign 
policy deliverable and/or the role of femocrats within delegations. The ‘friends of 1325’ 
understood the importance of consultation with like-minded allies prior to the official 
negotiations. This was a strategy they employed when they met informally to coordinate 
strategies for the pursuit of their agenda in meetings (NATO, 2010). This approach has proved 
pivotal to advancing the WPS agenda at NATO (NATO Official, 2014). However, it should 
also be noted that membership of the ‘friends of 1325’ group does not equate to a commitment 
to implementing UNSCR 1325; rather, states have learned the cost of not providing tacit 
support for the WPS agenda. As one NATO Official put it ‘gender is an issue you can’t be seen 
not to support’ (NATO Official, 2014). This suggests an understanding of gender at NATO as 
a non-contentious issue, or even a side-issue and one which does not pose a threat to national 
agendas. Nevertheless, the ‘friends of 1325’ have provided an important forum through which 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 could be advanced. 
The roles of two partner states and members of the ‘friends of 1325’ – Austria and Sweden – 
are a case in point of how a foreign policy deliverable can be realised at the regional level. For 
example, Austria played an instrumental role in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 and built 
upon its track record of championing UNSCR 1325 as part of a foreign policy deliverable at 
the EU (Holzner in Eyben and Turquet, 2013). Austria proved itself as an effective supporter 
by acting as a ‘tiger team’ to bring in others to support the agenda (NATO Official, 2014). The 
centrality of Sweden to NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 is unsurprising. Sweden has 
actively sought to position itself at the centre of global efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 and 
as part of this supported the adoption of NATO’s military concept for implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 2014: 63). The support of NATO partner states has 
been pivotal but has also served to symbolically separate the WPS agenda from NATO and 
position it as somewhat external to the Alliance. 
The ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 for NATO 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 built upon the decades of feminist organising within NATO 
and the creation of gender machinery within the organisation; it also relied upon the support of 
NATO partner states. Nevertheless, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by NATO would not have 
come about at the time it did without NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan (NATO Official, 
2014); as such, Afghanistan has shaped the value NATO places on UNSCR 1325. The 
challenges of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission required 
NATO to improve strategic dialogue among contributors (Mattelaer 2011) and UNSCR 1325 
offered one shared starting point from which NATO could foster a ‘community of practice’ 
with partners, including Sweden (Wagnsson, 2011:598). Moreover, the adoption of UNSCR 
1325 was intended to support NATO’s Comprehensive Approach  – an acknowledgement that 
military means on their own were not enough to achieve operational goals (NATO, 2007b). 
This led, in part, to UNSCR 1325 being viewed instrumentally as a tool to increase operational 
effectiveness when it was adopted by NATO’s military structure. 
The focus on UNSCR 1325 as a tool to increase operational effectiveness has been reinforced 
through Sweden’s role in supporting the adoption of the military concept for the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts, 2014: 63) and in hosting the 
‘Department Head’ for NATO’s gender training at the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military 
Operations (NCGM) (Rasmussen, 2013).4  The Swedish Military Representative to the EU and 
NATO, Major General Karl Engelbrektson, has stressed the importance of including a gender 
perspective because of the ‘strategic’ and ‘operational effect’ of incorporating diverse 
perspectives (Engelbrektson, 2011). Again, the central role of Sweden – a NATO partner – can 
be seen to symbolise the separation of the WPS agenda from NATO and the Alliance’s core 
purpose as a defence organisation, it has also helped shaped a very particular understanding of 
the value of UNSCR 1325. 
The adoption of the military concept – Bi-Strategic Command 40-1 – in 2009 (subsequently 
revised in 2012) extended the provisions of the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325 to 
NATO’s military structure. The concept built upon the NATO/EAPC policy on UNSCR 1325, 
which had stressed the added value of women’s participation in NATO operations ‘due to 
cultural factors’ but also for ‘successful force generation by mobilizing additional resources’ 
(NATO/EAPC, 2007). It drew attention to ‘the importance of women in the military forces of 
the Alliance’ because of ‘the influence they can have in all stages of conflict or crisis… to 
enhance the effectiveness of NATO-led operations and missions in order to ensure Alliance 
success’ (NATO, 2009). This framed an essential part of achieving the aims of UNSCR 1325 
as the ‘pursuit of [the] real operational use of female soldiers’ (Masdea, 2012: 15). In this 
respect NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has framed the Resolution as a means to advance 
NATO’s pre-existing concern with the status of women in NATO forces. An agenda which has 
arguably stalled because despite some nominal progress, the representation of women in NATO 
militaries remains low. For example, Turkey (1%) and Poland (2.9%) have the lowest rates of 
gender inclusiveness and Hungary (20%) and Latvia (17.2%) have the highest (Obradovic, 
2014: 52). However, this framing also links to the Nordic states’ approach to UNSCR 1325, 
which has focused on increasing the representation of women in the military (Bergman 
Rosamond, 2014: 18). This is unsurprising given the role Sweden and other Nordic states have 
had in supporting UNSCR 1325 at NATO, in particular through the ‘friends of 1325’. 
 
The pursuit of the increased representation of women in NATO armed forces, under the 
auspices of UNSCR 1325, can undermine the transformative potential of integrating a gender 
perspective when pursued for instrumental reasons (including to increase operational 
effectiveness). NATO’s concern with the status of women in the military is multifaceted, and 
while it can be attributed to concern over the ‘manpower’ capacity5 of member states (Enloe, 
1983: 131), it can also serve an ideological purpose (Mathers, 2013: 133) or become ‘a marker 
of civilizational difference and superiority’ in NATO-led interventions (McBride and Wibben, 
2012: 207). For example, McBride and Wibben (2012: 200) find that the gendering of 
counterinsurgency and the use of Female Engagement Teams as part of the NATO-led ISAF 
mission was part of an attempt to frame intervention in Afghanistan as a ‘humanitarian, even 
progressive, mission’. The integration of women in the military in support of broader 
operational or ideological goals further undermines the transformative potential of integrating 
a gender perspective, by creating an expectation that women will bring diversity with them 
(Kronsell, 2012: 67). In so doing the existing majority is normalised and constructed ‘as 
homogenous and naturally associated with the organization’ (Kronsell, 2012:67). Moreover, 
this expectation of diversity is in contradiction to the foundation of military training, whereby 
a recruit’s individuality is stripped from them so that they become part an obedient part of the 
military whole, able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). 
The integration of women into NATO forces for instrumental purposes therefore supports, 
rather than challenges, the existing gender regime and reinforces existing gender binaries. 
Again, it indicates the possibility that UNSCR 1325 can be co-opted to support existing 
agendas, rather than (solely) to support transformative change. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis has drawn attention to the opportunities for – and hindrances to – institutional 
change in line with feminist goals within international security institutions. It has 
contextualised NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as a culmination of the decades of 
incremental progress to put women’s issues and gender onto NATO’s agenda. In doing so, the 
article has drawn attention to the role of femocrats operating within NATO structures and the 
challenges they face in pursuing a feminist agenda within a resistant institution. In particular, 
the emotions invoked by such an agenda increase the possibility that the agenda will be written 
off as a personal, rather than a professional one, even when it is a defined part of a foreign 
policy deliverable or institutional mandate. The role of femocrats in supporting the 
establishment of NATO’s gender machinery has been crucial to the establishment of the 
institutional knowledge and gender expertise necessary to support NATO’s adoption of 
UNSCR 1325. NATO’s gender machinery, particularly NATO’s concern with the status of 
women in NATO armed forces, provided a foundation for UNSCR 1325 to be introduced as 
part of NATO’s remit.  
The critical role of NATO partners and member states in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 
has demonstrated that in a post-Cold War world it is no longer possible to assume that the aim 
of all NATO member states and partners is to influence (just) the USA. Rather, they can use a 
particular initiative – in this case on UNSCR 1325 – as a tool for public diplomacy on an issue 
larger states have not taken ownership of, but which can be framed as salient for the Alliance. 
NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 also challenges dominant understandings of NATO 
partnerships as solely a means through which NATO can influence partner states.  
NATO’s institutional composition and extensive gender machinery have provided 
opportunities for supporting the adoption of UNSCR 1325. In understanding NATO as a 
political community it has been possible to understand the effectiveness of the strategies 
employed by the ‘friends of 1325’ to successfully champion UNSCR 1325. They did so through 
ongoing discussions within both informal and formal structures and learnt strategies from each 
other to advance their agenda. This has epitomised one way in which NATO functions as a 
‘teaching machine’. NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ also meant that NATO members and 
partners learnt the value of UNSCR 1325 as a diplomatic tool to further their own interests, 
incommensurate of status. In one sense, NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged the 
transformative potential of the Resolution; turning it into an instrumental tool has both limited 
its transformative potential and made it into an issue states feel they must be seen to support. 
In understanding NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ it is possible to comprehend how NATO came 
to value UNSCR 1325 as of ‘added value’ to the alliance and as a tool to increase operational 
effectiveness both through organisational structures and through the NATO-led intervention in 
Afghanistan. Yet this has also served to limit how far the adoption of UNSCR 1325 has 
challenged NATO’s existing gender regime. UNSCR 1325 can be seen to support the status 
quo in terms of the prevailing gendered norms which characterise NATO’s organisational 
structure and NATO-led operations, because the implication of ‘adding value’ is that UNSCR 
1325 remains of instrumental importance to NATO, rather than a core part of the organisation’s 
remit as a collective defence alliance.  
 Acknowledgements 
The author would like to thank all those interviewed for the invaluable knowledge and insight 
they provided. In addition to the convenors of this special issue, Nicole George and Laura J. 
Shepherd, the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their detailed and helpful feedback, 
which has helped to produce a stronger article. 
 
Funding  
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, 
or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
Notes 
1 Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović served as Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy from 2011 to 2014. It is 
noteworthy that the first woman to hold such a position did so for a something some in NATO would perceive 
of as a ‘soft issue’. 
2 This is not to say that these women did not go onto become experts on the issue and femocrats in their own 
right. 
3 Austria and Sweden are not NATO members but are members of EAPC, Croatia became a NATO member in 
2009 
4 The award of Department Head status is a recognition of where NATO’s expertise in a particular area is 
situated. 
5 Manpower is a military term used to describe the number of individuals available for active service. It is a 
gendered term but (usually) refers to the availability of both men and women to serve. 
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